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THE CRIME, THE CASE, THE KILLER COCKTAIL: WHY
MARYLAND'S
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
PROCEDURE
CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[D]eath is different .... " I It is this principle that establishes the
death penalty as one of the most controversial topics in legal history,
even when implemented only for the most heinous criminal acts. 2 In
fact, "[n]o aspect of modern penal law is subjected to more efforts to
influence public attitudes or to more intense litigation than the death
penalty.,,3 Over its long history, capital punishment has changed in
many ways as a result of this litigation and continues to spark
controversy at the very mention of its existence. 4
This Comment will address the newest controversy in capital
litigation: The possibility of undue pain and suffering caused to a
defendant executed by lethal injection. Central to this emerging issue
is a Supreme Court case, Hill v. McDonough, 5 and a Maryland case,
Evans v. State. 6 Hill became the foundation for capital challenges
based on the unconstitutionality of the method of execution. 7
Although the court has yet to render a decision in Evans, this case
could forever affect Maryland's capital punishment structure, and
potentially abolish the death penalty in Maryland.
As no decision on a controversial issue of law can be reached
without a firm grasp of the history of that issue, this Comment will
begin with an examination of the history of capital punishment both

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES v (Hugo Adam
Bedau ed., 1997).
J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital Punishment, 58 FLA. L. REv.
639, 640 (2006).
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA xiv-xvi (J 986).
126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).
As of January 4, 2008, an opinion has not been rendered in Evans. Mr. Evans's suit
was filed in the U.S. District Court in Baltimore City under Chief Judge Benson
Legg.
Gail Gibson & Jennifer McMenamin, Death Row Appeals Backed; Justices Allow
More Challenges to Lethal injection and New Claims of innocence, BALT. SUN, June
13,2006, at IA.
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in this country, 8 and in Maryland. 9 This examination will include a
commentary on the history of challenges to the capital punishment
structure and the landmark cases that shaped the death penalty in this
country.10 It will also address lethal injection, the specific method of
execution currently used in a majority of states, and how a defendant
dies by this form of capital punishment. 11 This method has come
under significant fire of late based on the potential for botched or
failed executions,12 as well as the ban on physician-assisted
executions. 13
Having established the process by which the death penalty reached
its current status, this Comment will then discuss and analyze 14 the
main question facing capital punishment in Maryland: Does
Maryland's capital ~unishment procedure constitute cruel and
unusual punishment? 5
This Comment will then address the
aforementioned landmark case, Hill v. McDonough,16 the U.S.
Supreme Court case that opened the door for constitutional
challenges to the death penalty based on the cruel and unusual nature
of a state's method of execution. 17 This Comment also reviews
Evans v. State,18 the Maryland case that could change the face of
capital punishment in this state and potentially outlaw the death
penalty under state law. 19
Finally, this Comment will address the likely future of capital
punishment in this country. 20 Based on the analysis of four main
constitutional concerns facing Maryland's death penalty system, this
Comment also proposes solutions for the problems facing capital
punishment in Maryland. 21 This Comment calls for change. It seeks
abolition of Maryland's death penalty based on the cruel and unusual
nature of its capital punishment structure or a long-term moratorium

8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
IS.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.3.
Jennifer McMenamin, Evans Suit Leads to Changes; Lethal Injections Modified After
Action Filed, Execution Official Testifies, BALT. SUN, Sept. 22, 2006, at 58.
See infra Part 11.B.3.b.
See infra Part II.B.4.
See infra Part II.B.4.
126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).
See infra Part II.B.4.a.i.
See supra note 6.
See infra Part II.B.4.a.ii.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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on executions until a fair, consistent, and reliable method and process
for executions can be established. 22

II.

THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A.

Capital Punishment in the United States

1.

An Early History

The death penalty has been consistently used as a form of
punishment in this country since the early colonial period. 23 Since
this country's first execution in 1608,24 more than 15,000 individuals
have been executed 25 -not only for murder, but also for lesser
crimes, such as rape or counterfeiting. 26 "Through most of the
nation's history, the proposition that authorities had the legal and
moral right to take the lives of those who committed serious crimes
was taken for granted by the bulk of the citizenry.,,27
Although opposition to the death penalty was visible beginning
after the Revolutionary War,28 it was not until the mid-1960s that the
death penalty came under considerable fire. 29 Prior to that time,
courts heard two types of capital cases: appeals from prisoners based
on violations of their constitutional rights before or during their
respective trials 30 and appeals based on certain barbaric methods of

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part IV.
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994 7 (1996).
In 1608, Captain George Kendall was the first person to be executed in what would
become the United States. !d.
According to the Death Penalty Information Center [hereinafter DPIC], available
online at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org, 15,585 people were executed between the
first execution in 1608 and December 13,2006. See DPIC, Searchable Database of
Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglexecutions.php (last visited Mar. 12,
2007); DPIC, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgiarticIe.php?scid=8&did=111 0 (last visited Mar. 12,
2007). These figures are compiled from a historical record known as the Espy file.
DPIC, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State, supra.
This
information is admittedly incomplete, however, as at least one individual researcher
has determined that additional executions occurred during this time period and were
not recorded in the Espy file. Id.
HAINES, supra note 23, at 7.
/d.
ld.
See id. at 23-26.
Id. at 24.
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execution 31 being cruel and unusual forms of punishment.
It was
not until a pair of law review articles was published in 1961 that a
33
formidable assault against the death penalty was initiated.
The first article, authored by Gerald Gottlieb, asserted that
executions may "on a sufficient factual showing, be found violative
of the Eighth Amendment, since death ... may ... with good reason
be alleged to be 'cruel and unusual' punishment and within the reach
of the Eighth Amendment .... ,,34 Later that year, Walter Oberer
published a second article that called into question what he
considered a "procedural flaw" in capital cases. 35 Oberer challenged
procedures where jurors with moral oppositions to the death penalty
were excluded from capital juries. 36 This trend could potentially
establish juries "inclined toward guilty verdicts. ,,37
The assault on the death penalty continued in the United States
Supreme Court, where Justice Arthur Goldberg stated, in a dissenting
opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama,38 that the Court would possibly be
open to hearing arguments against the constitutionality of the death
penalty, such as those proposed by Gottlieb and Oberer. 39 The
Goldberg dissent, which questioned whether "the imposition of the
death penalty ... violate[s] 'evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of [our] maturing society,' or 'standards of decency

31.

32.
33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

Jd. The "mechanical aspects" of executions challenged during this time included
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and second electrocutions after a botched
first attempt. !d.; see also Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 46061 (1947).
HAINES, supra note 23, at 24.
Jd. at 26.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 121 (Bryan
Vila & Cynthia Morris eds., 1997) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (quoting
Gerald Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 268, 270 (1961»; see
also HAINES, supra note 23, at 26.
HAINES, supra note 23, at 26; see also Walter E. Oberer, Does Disqualification of
Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on
issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REv. 545, 547-48 (1961).
HAINES, supra note 23, at 26; see also Oberer, supra note 35, at 547-48. Oberer
argues that the common prosecutor practice of "death qualification," the act of
excluding jurors who state during voir dire examination that they have a moral
opposition to the death penalty, "stack[s] the deck against the defendant's claim that
he was not guilty." HAINES, supra note 23, at 26.
HAINES, supra note 23, at 26; see also Oberer, supra note 35, at 545.
375 U.S. 889,889-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Jd.; see also HAINES, supra note 23, at 26.
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more or less universally'" acknowledged,40 served as a signal that a
change was on the horizon. 41
Fueled by Goldberg's dissent in Rudolph, the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), one of the prima~
groups engaged in the national abolitionist movement at that time,
initiated a two-pronged attack on the death penalty.43 First, the LDF
brought to light the racial discrimination present in death
sentencing. 44 African-American defendants were much more likely
to be convicted if their victims were white. 45 The second prong of
the attack focused on certain trial procedures in capital cases. 46 The
LDF primarily attacked: "(1) the exclusion of [jurors morally
opposed to the death penalty]; (2) the simultaneous determination of
guilt and sentence in a single trial; and (3) the lack of precise
standards to pide juries in deciding whether to condemn a defendant
to death.,,4
The Supreme Court heard arguments on the
abolitionists' procedural claims in 1971.
In McGautha v.
California,48 the Court rejected these arguments and upheld, as
constitutional, both the lack of guidelines for jury deliberations and
unitary trials where guilt and sentence were decided in the same
proceeding. 49 Although the arguments failed, shortly thereafter, the
abolitionist movement gained a monumental decision in Furman v.
. 50
Georgza.
Two months after its decisions in McGautha, the Court announced
that, in Furman, it would examine whether the then-current
administration of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 51

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 890 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
HAINES, supra note 23, at 27.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
/d. at 221. This case arose from two separate cases, People v. McGautha, 452 P.2d
650 (Cal. 1969), and State v. Crampton, 248 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1969). See
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 185.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Four death penalty cases were originally consolidated in Furman. Besides Furman,
the other cases included in the decision were Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501
(Ga. 1969), and Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1969). Aikens v. California,
406 U.S. 813 (1972), one of the original cases consolidated in Furman. was

84
2.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

Furman v. Georgia

In Furman, two defendants were sentenced to the death penalty
after being convicted of rape. 52 A third defendant was convicted of
murder and likewise, sentenced to death. 53 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in each case to specifically address the question of
"whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitute
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth"
Amendment. 54
Historically, the Court's decisions established that the sentence of
death "is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be
inhuman and barbarous.,,55 The Court also reiterated what had been
established previously: the perception of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment may change "as public opinion pecomes
enlightened by a humane justice.,,56 The Eighth Amendment "must
draw its meaning from the evolvin~ standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."
Under these premises, the Court examined the state of the death
penalty based on the current perceptions of moral justice,58 and
decided that a method of punishment could be perceived as cruel and
unusual if it discriminated against certain individuals or if such a
punishment was imrsosed under a procedure that could be affected by
personal prejudice. 9 Based on studies done throughout the country
that suggested that the death penalty was imposed more often on
African-American defendants, the Court suggested that the death
penalty was imposed in a discriminatory fashion. 6o The Court further
found that legislatures, in enacting death penalty statutes, had failed
to adequately define capital crimes or to establish a set of guidelines
for juries such that an e~uitable decision could be reached in regards
to the ultimate penalty. 6 The Court stated that, although the death

52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

dismissed when the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional in early 1972. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 140.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890» (arguing hanging
constituted an inhuman and barbarous method of execution and that death by
electrocution did not).
Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., concurring).
1d. at 242 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958».
Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 242-45.
Id. at 249.
[d.
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penalty itself is not cruel and unusual ~unishment, "the vice ... [is]
in the process by which it is inflicted." 2 In other words, "the death
penalty, like lightning, will strike some, but not others, in a way that
defies rational explanation.,,63 In sum, Justice Douglas stated,
quoting Warden Lewis E. Lawes of Sing Sing Prison, that "no
punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects" as the
death penalty.64 In so finding, Justice Douglas cited the unequal
imposition of the death penalty to the rich and the poor-it is "the
powerless ... who are executed"-to support his decision. 65 Four
other justices-Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall-joined
Douglas in holding that the death penalty was "cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. ,,66
With that decision, the Furman Court officially outlawed capital
punishment in the United States under the then-current method of
administration. 67 The death sentences of more than six hundred
death row inmates were immediately commuted to life
imprisonment. 68 The decision of the Supreme Court, however, was
far from wholly conclusive. 69 In fact, the Court did not find that
capital punishment, in and of itself, was unconstitutional. 70 The
decision allowed states to implement the death penalty under
procedures that were not considered cruel or unusual punishment. 71
In September 1973, just a year after the Furman decision, California
reinstated the death penalty under a new statute, although no inmates
were actually executed there until 1992. 72

62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 247-48.
State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415,462 (S.D. 1996) (Amundson, l, dissenting).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 141.
!d.
Id.
Id.
!d.
Id. at 141 n.!. The long drought between reinstitution of the death penalty and the
first execution in California under the new statute is likely due to the long appeals
process mandatory in capital cases. California Revives the Death Penalty, TIME,
Apr. 27,1992, at IS. The presence of several liberal judges on California's Supreme
Court also contributed to the delay. When those judges were removed from office,
the door was opened for executions to resume. Associated Press, Bird Produces
Negative Image in Campaign, Pollster Finds, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1986, at 36.
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Following Furman, public support of the death penalty grew to
some of its highest levels since the mid-1950s. 73
In fact,
approximately two-thirds of the country supported the reinstitution of
capital punishment. 74 A majority of states began implementing new
capital punishment structures/ 5 and in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court
reexamined the use of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia 76 and
Woodson v. North Carolina. 77 Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens, having taken the bench in 1975 to replace Justice William
Douglas, appeared to be the swing vote that would determine the
future of the death penalty.78 Before Gregg, Justice Stevens had
never issued a ruling on the death penalty, therefore his decision was
unpredictable. 79
3.

Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina

Both Gregg and Woodson arose out of the states' efforts to
reinstitute the death penalty under a statute that would pass
constitutional muster. so In Gregg, which was the lead decision of
cases S1 from three states-Georgia, Florida, and Texas-the Supreme
Court examined "guided discretion statutes."S2 Woodson became the
lead case of two cases S3 that challenged state laws which required
mandatory death sentences for certain crimes.
In Gregg, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and
murder and was sentenced to death under Georgia's new, post-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 160.
Id.
Id. at 148.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
HAINES, supra note 23, at 52.
Id.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 161-62.
Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976), were reviewed at the same time, as those three states had
adopted similar statutes which alleviated the procedural concerns that led to the
decision in Furman. Each of these statutes created bifurcated trials, where guilt and
sentencing were tried in different proceedings. Mandatory appellate review of all
death sentences was also included. Finally, the statutes included factors to consider
in the jury decision, designed to help juries adequately weigh the crime with
aggravating and mitigating factors. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 16162.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 161.
Woodson v. South Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), was decided alongside Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), as both states had enacted statutes that required the
death penalty for certain crimes. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 161.
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Furman, death penalty statute. 84 The trial was held in two phasesguilt and penalty. 85 During the guilt phase, the trial judge submitted
the case to the jury under both felony-murder and nonfelony-murder
charges. 86 The robbery charges were submitted to the ~lp)' under
armed robbery and robbery by intimidation, a lesser crime. 7 Despite
being instructed on the issue of self-defense, the jury found the
defendant guilty on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of
murder. 88 During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jury that
they could recommend either capital punishment or life in prison for
each count. 89 The judge also presented, in accordance with the new
statute, several aggravating and mitigating factors which could
After deliberation, the jury
influence the jury's decision. 90
recommended the death penalty on all four counts. 9I
On appeal, the Supreme Court took the case to decide whether
Georgia's new death penalty statute constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 92
Having previously stated that the death penalty is not, in and of itself,
cruel and unusual,93 the Court based its decision on the
implementation of bifurcated trials, the increase in jury guidance for
capital trials, and the availability of prompt appellate review of
capital sentences. 94
Because the statute provided sufficient
protection against potential ignorance, misunderstanding, or bias by
the jury and a checks and balances system in appellate courts, the
Court held that the death penalty, as applied by the Georgia statute
was neither cruel, nor unusual punishment. 95 The Court also rejected
the petitioner's primary argument that societal views of decency
forbid capital punishment, pointing to the legislative response to
Furman and a general national support for the death penalty.96 By a
7-2 vote, the death penalty returned to the United States. 97
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
/d.

Id.
Id. at 161.

91.

/d.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 162.
See id. at 177-78.
Id. at 196-207.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 179.
HAINES, supra note 23, at 52.
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In Woodson v. North Carolina, 98 the two defendants, James
Woodson and Luby Waxton, and two others, committed the armed
robbery of a convenience store. 99 The store clerk was killed durinij
the robbery, and an innocent bystander was severely injured. lo
Throughout the trial, Woodson maintained his innocence on the
murder charges. 101 The facts of the case suggested that Woodson's
involvement in the robbery consisted of driving the getaway car and
some preparatory tasks. 102 After a guilty verdict was returned by the
jury, both defendants were sentenced under North Carolina's death
penalty statute, which made the death penalty mandatory for all firstdegree murder convictions. 103 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal, and the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether mandatory
death sentences were constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 104
The Court reasoned that a mandatory imposition of the death
penalty was unconstitutional because it "depart [ed] markedly from
contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment
of death and thus [could not] be applied consistently ... 'within the
limits of civilized standards.'" 105 Furthermore, the Court found that
the statute failed to establish "unbridled jury discretion" as required
by Furman v. Georgia or "particularized consideration" by the jury
of mitigating factors, such as the character and record of the
accused. l06 Having found the North Carolina statute to be a violation
of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court set aside
the mandatory death sentence statute. 107
4.

Post-Gregg Modifications to Capital Punishment

The Court's decisions in Gregg and Woodson prompted intense
scrutiny of the death penalty. Over time, the Supreme Court has
tightened and loosened the restraints on capital sentencing, eventually
resulting in the death penalty as it stands today. The significant

98.
99.
100.
10 1.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

428 u.s. 280 (1976).
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (1969) (repealed 1976); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at
284.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 284-85.
Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 305.
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Supreme Court decisions that have shaped today's capital punishment
scheme include outlawing the death penalty for "lesser crimes" such
as rape I 08 and the ex~ansion of the admissibility of character
evidence of the accused. 09 These decisions increased a defendant's
due process rights, therefore strengthening a defendant's ability to
protect him or herself from a capital conviction. llo The reinstitution
of the death penalty reawakened the abolitionist movement in the
United States, and beginning in the mid-1980s, the Su~reme Court
was deluged with capital challenges for various reasons. I I
The abolitionist movement, post-Gregg, resulted in significant
structural changes to the way capital punishment was carried out in
this country. Abolitionists successfully narrowed the scope of the
death penalty over time through Supreme Court decisions that
prevented the execution of insane defendants,112 minors under the
age of sixteen, 113 and the profoundly mentally retarded. 114
The controversy surrounding capital punishment continued both
inside the Supreme Court and outside in the general public. In
Callins v. Collins, I 15 the struggle culminated in Justice Harry
Blackmun abandoning the decision-making process altogether. I 16 In
a landmark dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death. . .. I feel morally and intellectually
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed.... The problem is that the
inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a
system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

114.

115.
116.

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 602 (1978).
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 195.
HAINES, supra note 23, at 73-79.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988), first established that defendants
who committed their crimes before they reached the age of sixteen could not be
executed. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,377 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court held that the death penalty could be
imposed on defendants who committed crimes at the age of sixteen or seventeen.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
384 (2002). Penry states that the execution of mentally retarded individuals is not
categorically prohibited, but that the mental retardation must be adequately described
as a mitigating factor. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 241.
510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
Id. at 1145-46 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
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system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable
sentences of death required by the Constitution. 117
B.

Capital Punishment in Maryland

After the Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland deemed capital punishment unconstitutional
except in those circumstances where the death penalty is
mandatory.118 The Maryland legislature, in response to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland's decision, established a mandato~ death
sentence for some, specifically-defined first-degree murders. I 9 After
the Supreme Court announced its decision in Woodson v. North
Carolina,120 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled mandatory
death sentences unconstitutional. 121 As a result, the legislature
revised Maryland's capital punishment statute by constructing a law
intended to conform to the laws established by the Supreme Court. 122
The new statute established bifurcated trials, mandatory appellate
review, and the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in each capital trial. 123
In 1994, Maryland's death penalty statute was amended to state
that lethal injection shall be the method of execution for all
defendants sentenced to the death penalty after March 25, 1994. 124
Prior to this date, inmates had been executed in the gas chamber.
Those inmates condemned prior to March 25, 1994, had the choice of
execution by lethal gas or by lethal injection. 125 Lethal injection
would be utilized for all defendants sentenced after the amendment,
as is the prevalent method throughout the rest of the country. 126

117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

126.

Id.
Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 184, 297 A.2d 696, 70 I (1972).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Roann Nichols,
Tichnell v. State-Maryland's Death Penalty: The Needfor Reform, 42 MD. L. REV.
875,877 (1983).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 473, 365 A.2d 545, 549 (1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 918 (1977); see also Nichols, supra note 119, at 877.
Nichols, supra note 119, at 877.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 413-414 (1978) (repealed 2002).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 627 (1994) (repealed 2002); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-303(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007).
See
DPIC,
Methods
of
Execution,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=8&did=245 (last visited Mar. 12,2007).
Casey Lynne Ewart, Use of the Drug Pavulon in Lethal Injections: Cruel and
Unusual?, 14 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. J. 1159, 1159 (2006).
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In 2000, an Illinois death penalty case sparked national debate over
the death penalty, and the controversy extended to Maryland. 127 In
2002, then-Governor Parris N. Glendening, troubled that all nine
Maryland death row inmates were of African-American descent,
ordered all executions be halted for one year pending public and
legislative review of a University of Maryland study (to be released
later that year) on the effect of race on the capital punishment system
in the United States. 128
The study thoroughly examined
"suggestions ... that the imposition of the death penalty in Maryland
[was] influenced by factors such as race and the particular legal
jurisdiction where the homicide occurred.,,!29 The study provided
empirical data suggesting that African-American defendants were
significantly more likely to be given the death rcenalty than Caucasian
defendants who committed the same crimes.! 0 Likewise, the death
penalty is implemented in cases where African-American defendants
kill Caucasian victims more often than any other racial
relationship. 131 The study further suggested that legal jurisdiction
plays a part in the imposition of the sentence of death. \32 The study
showed that a prosecutor's decision to charge a death-eligible
homicide as a capital offense is significantly different in different
jurisdictions of Maryland. 133 Based on those results, "clearly the
jurisdiction where the homicide occurs matters and matters a great
deal." 134
Less than a year later, despite the information released in the study,
newly-elected governor Robert Ehrlich ended the moratorium, and
executions resumed in the state without modification of the death
penalty statute or procedure. 135

127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See David Nitkin & Dennis O'Brien, Elsewhere, Questions About Death Penalty,
BALT. SUN, May 10,2002, at 17A.
Dennis O'Brien & David Nitkin, Glendening Halts Executions, BALT. SUN, May 10,
2002, at lA.
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE
AND LEGAL JURISDICTION: FINAL REPORT 1 (2003), http://www.newsdesk.umd.edul
pdf/finalrep.pdf [hereinafter EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS]'
Id. at 21, 43 fig.2.
ld. at 22-23, 45 figA.
ld. at 28-31.
ld. at 29-30.
ld. at 31.
Stephanie Hanes & Sarah Koenig, Md. Judge Agrees to Execution of Oken, BALT.
SUN, Jan. 22, 2003, at IA.

92

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

Shortly after the study was released, Maryland's Attorney General,
J. Joseph Curran, called for an end to capital punishment in
Maryland, citing the possibility of the wrongful execution of an
innocent defendant. 136 Governor Ehrlich, however, promised to veto
any bill seeking a moratorium or the abolition of Maryland's death
penalty. 137 Ehrlich's threats were unnecessary, however, as bills to
abolish the death penalty and to extend Glendening's moratorium
both failed on the state senate floor. 138
The debate over the death penalty reached a head on December 19,
2006, when the Court of Appeals of Maryland halted all executions in
the state, "ruling that procedures for putting prisoners to death were
never submitted for the public review required by law." 139 The court
made this decision in Evans v. State,140 where Vernon Lee Evans, Jr.,
along with two other plaintiffs, filed a motion to vacate their
respective death sentences based on the state's violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).141 The Court found that the
protocol dictating the manner in which lethal injection is carried out
in Maryland was· a "regulation" under the Maryland APA. 142
Because the protocol was not submitted for public and legislative
review, it was a violation of the APA, and therefore "ineffective." 143
The decision merely postpones executions in the state until the
legislature can review the issue, and either "submit the execution
protocols to the scrutiny of a joint legislative committee and schedule
a public hearing on the issue" or, although unlikely, "exempt the
execution procedures from that review process." 144
As it currently stands, Maryland's death penal!)' exists under the
2002 version of the Maryland Code Annotated. 145 On February 21,
2007, both the Maryland Senate and the House of Delegates

136.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.

Sarah Koenig, Attorney General Calls for Abolition of Md. Death Penalty; Curran
Says Threat of Executing Innocent People Is Too Great, BALT. SUN, Jan. 31, 2003, at
6B.
Id.
See Stephanie Desmon, Death Penalty Freeze Rejected, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19,2003, at
lB.
Jennifer McMenamin, Md. Executions Halted; State Court Finds Procedures
Established Improperly, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 2006, at IA.
396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006).
Jd. at 271, 914 A.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 346, 914 A.2d at 78. The Maryland APA requires public and legislative review
for those procedures deemed "regulations." McMenamin, supra note 139.
Evans, 396 Md. at 349-50, 914 A.2d at 80-81; see also McMenamin, supra note
139.
McMenamin, supra note 139.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007).
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considered testimony from current Governor Martin O'Malley and
several prominent pro- and anti-death penalty groups on a bill to
repeal the death penalty permanently.14 Although the bill failed at
committee,147 the controversy remains, and the death penalty
continues to stand on "shaky ground.,,148 When a new abolition bill
inevitably comes before the Maryland General Assembly in the
future, the legislature will have to examine the current capital
punishment structure, which includes three main areas of
controversy: the crime, the case, and the killer cocktail.
1.

The Crime

As stated previously, in Maryland, the only crimes punishable bJ
death are those that fall within the category of first-degree murder. I
This trend is consistent with a majority of the country's current
practices. 15o Some states, however, continue to implement the death
penalty for crimes not resulting in death, but that trend is an
146.
147.
148.

149.

Jennifer Skalka, 0 'Malley Lobbies/or Repeal, SALT. SUN, Feb. 22, 2007, at IA.
Jean Marbella, Capital Punishment Holds Shaky Ground, SALT. SUN, Mar. 16,2007,
at IS.
Jd.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(b)(I) (LexisNexis 2002). In Maryland, a
murder is in the first degree if it is:
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)

150.

a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing;
committed by lying in wait;
committed by poison; or
committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate:
(i) arson in the first degree;
(ii) burning a bam, stable, tobacco house, warehouse, or
other outbuilding ... ;
(iii) burglary in the first, second, or third degree;
(iv) caIjacking or anned carjacking;
(v) escape in the first degree from a State correctional
facility or a local correctional facility;
(vi) kidnapping ... ;
(vii) mayhem;
(viii) rape;
(ix) robbery ... ;
(x) sexual offense in the first or second degree;
(xi) sodomy; or
(xii) a violation of [the Criminal Article] concerning
destructive devices.
ld. § 2-20 I (a).
See
DPIC,
Crimes
Punishable
by
the
Death
Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?did= I 44&scid=1O (last visited Mar. 12,
2007).
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exception to current capital punishment standards. 151 For a murder to
qualify as first-degree murder in Maryland, a murder must be "a
deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing, ... committed by lying
in wait, ... committed by poison, ... or [a murder] committed in the
. 0 f or an attempt to perpetrate " certam
. cnmes.
.
152
perpetratIOn
2.

The Case

If a defendant is charged with a first-degree murder in Maryland,
and the state chooses to seek the death penalty, certain criteria must
be met before a death sentence can be imposed.1 53 First, the
defendant must be a principal in the first degree,154 or, in the case of
the murder of a law enforcement officer, a princ~al in the second
degree 155 who meets certain aggravating factors. I 6 In addition, at
least thirty days before trial, the state must give the defendant notice
both of its intention to seek the death penaltr and of the aggravating
circumstances upon which the state will rely. 57
If a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, and if the state
gave sufficient notice to the defendant that the death penalty would
be sought, a separate sentencing trial must be held to "determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death." 158
This
151.

152.

153.
154.
155.
156.

157.
158.

Of the thirty-seven states which currently implement the death penalty, eleven have
extended the scope of capital offenses to lesser crimes than first degree murder. In
some states, crimes such as treason (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia and
Louisiana), trainwrecking (California), peIjury causing execution (California) or
death (Idaho), drug trafficking (Florida), sexual battery (Florida) or sexual assault
(Montana), felony murder (Florida), aircraft hijacking (Georgia and Mississippi),
aggravated kidnapping (Idaho, Kentucky and South Dakota), and aggravated rape of
a minor (Louisiana) are punishable by death. See id.
CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a). The State may seek the death penalty for a defendant who
commits a murder in the perpetration of (or attempt to perpetrate) first degree arson,
the burning of a building (not a dwelling) which contains cattle, horses, grain, hay,
tobacco or goods, burglary, caIjacking, prison escape, kidnapping, mayhem, rape,
robbery, first degree sexual offense, sodomy, or certain explosive-device crimes. Id.
§ 2-201 (a)(4).
See id. § 2-202.
A principal in the first degree is "the perpetrator of a crime." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1001 (Abr. 8th ed. 2005).
A principal in the second degree is "one who helped the perpetrator at the time of the
crime." Id.
CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(2)(ii). For the state to seek the death penalty against a
principal in the second degree of a murder of a law enforcement officer, the
defendant must "[have] willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation intended the
death of the law enforcement officer; ... [have been] a major participant in the
murder; and [have been] actually present at the time and place of the murder." Id.
Id. § 2-202(a)(1).
Id. § 2-303(b).
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sentencing hearing must be held before a jury-either the same jury
that convicted the defendant or a jury specifically empanelled for the
purposes of the proceeding. 159 A defendant may, conversely, waive
his jury rights for the sentencing proceeding. 160
To condemn a defendant to death, the court or jury must determine
whether any of the statutory aggravating 161 or mitigating 162 factors
exist. If the jury does not find that any aggravating circumstances
exist, a death sentence cannot be imposed. 163 If one or more
aggravating circumstances exist, the jury will then determine whether
any miti~ting circumstances preclude imposition of a death
sentence.
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the jury will recommend a sentence for the defendant.
A death sentence may only be imposed by a unanimous jury.165
Should a jury decide the evidence does not warrant a death sentence,
or if the state has failed to meet the procedural requirements of the
statute, a sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility of
parole, is imposed. 166 If a jury returns a death sentence for a
defendant, both the conviction and the sentence will be appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland automatically 167 in order to
"ensure[] the integrity of capital justice." 168 Defendants may petition
for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to seek further
appellate review.

159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

!d. § 2-303(c). A new jury will only be empanelled if:

(i) the defendant was convicted based on a guilty plea;
(ii) the defendant was convicted after a trial by a court sitting
without a jury;
(iii) the court, for good cause, discharged the jury that convicted
the defendant; or
(iv) a court of competent jurisdiction remanded the case for
resentencing following a review of the original sentence of death.
Id. § 2-303(c)(2).
See id. § 2-303(c)(3).
See id. § 2-303(g).
See id. § 2-303(h).
See id. § 2-303(g)(2).
See id. § 2-303(h)(2). If the combination of aggravating circumstances is outweighed
by the combination of mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may not be
imposed. See id. § 2-303(i)(l)-(2).
[d. § 2-303(i)(3).
See id. § 2-303(j).
MD. R. 8-306(c)(l).
Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 597, 755 A.2d 1088, 1100 (2000).
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Maryland's current method of execution, like a majority of states,
is by lethal injection. 169 It was originally thought that lethal injection
was the most humane way of ending a condemned inmate's life. 17o
The medical certainty that extreme pain was felt by prisoners when
executed by electrocution or the gas chamber was alleviated by the
system that closely resembled a "medical procedure.,,171 Such a
trend followed a historical pattern. "[New] methods of execution
have become popular because they are seen as more humane than any
of the other available alternatives; those methods are often replaced,
however after the public realizes that they are not as humane as they
seem." 17 2
Execution by lethal injection involves an intravenous dose of three
separate chemicals in succession,173 each believed to be individually
fatal in the proper doses. 174 Although the chemicals used may differ
from state to state, generally, the lethal injection regimen will include
an anesthetic, a paralytic, and a drug that stops the heart. 175 In
Maryland, the three drugs used during the lethal injection process are
sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide (also known as Pavulon),
and potassium chloride. 176
1.

Drug # 1 - sodium pentothal

Sodium pentothal, or a similar anesthetic, is the first drug used in
the lethal injection process. I77 Sodium pentothal is "a short-acting
barbiturate that is ordinarily used. . . in. . . anesthesia to render a
surgical patient unconscious for mere minutes." 178 The charge
against the use of this drug is that, because of the short-acting nature

169.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See CRIM. LAW § 2-303(1); see also DPIC, Methods of Execution, supra note 125.
See Greta Proctor, Comment, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a
Foolproof System, the Focus on Reform, and the International Factor, 42 GONZ. L.
REv. 211, 217 n.34 (2006-2007).
Ewart, supra note 126, at 1166.
Id. at 119!.
Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 337-38, 914 A.2d 25, 73 (2006).
Id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73.
See Ewart, supra note 126, at 1168--69, 1175.
Evans, 396 Md. at 337-38, 914 A.2d at 73.
See id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73.
David R. Dow et aI., The Extraordinary Execution of Billy Vickers, The Banality of
Death, and the Demise of Post-Conviction Review, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
521, 543 (2004).
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of the chemical, the drug may not sedate the defendant for the entire
execution. 179
11.

Drug #2 - pancuronium bromide

Pancuronium bromide, sometimes referred to as Pavulon, is a
paralytic drug used during some surgeries to paral~ze the body and,
in most states, during the lethal injection process. I 0 If a significant
dosage is injected, the drug can paral~ze the lungs and diaphragm,
thereby stopping a person's breathing. 81 The use of Pavulon during
the lethal injection process is intended to paralyze the body so that
the defendant stops breathing to the point of clinical death before the
third drug is injected to stop the heart. 182
Many challenges to capital punishment have arisen out of the use
of Pavulon in the execution cocktail. 183 These challenges are based
on allegations that the combination of the drug with some other
substances, including some sodium-based sedatives (such as sodium
pentothal), causes respiratory arrest before a loss of consciousness. 184
The possible result of such an occurrence would be that the defendant
feels significant pain while paralyzed. 185 In other words, the
defendant could feel intense pain but appear calm, "masking any
potential problems with the execution.,,186
iii. Drug #3 - potassium chloride
Potassium chloride is the third drug utilized in the execution
process. 187 The drug is used to stop the heart and complete the
execution. 188 A saline fluid is then passed through the defendant's
veins for ten seconds. 189 When an electrocardiogram (EKG) monitor
shows there is no heart activity, a ph~sician pronounces the defendant
dead, and the execution is complete. 90

179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 544.
See Ewart, supra note 126, at 1183.
Id.
/d.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
See id. at 1184-86.

Id.atI189.
Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 337-38,914 A.2d 25, 73 (2006).
Id. at 338, 914 A2d at 73.
Id. at 338, 914 A2d at 73-74.
/d. at 338, 914 A2d at 74.
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The doctor's conflict

Physicians have been witnessing executions since the first
execution by electrocution occurred in 1890. 191
Since 1982,
however, with the dawn of the lethal injection era, the moral and
ethical implications of medical participation in executions have
created significant controversy.192 The controversy surrounds the
Hypocratic Oath, taken by all doctors: "First, do no harm.'.I93
Assisting in an execution is a direct violation of this central tenet of
physician care. 194 As an American Medical Association (AMA)
executive vice president has stated, "When the healing hand becomes
the hand inflicting the wound, the world is turned inside out." 195
The ramifications of keeping doctors out of the execution chamber
can be equally troubling, however.
In 1984, a "mishandled
execution" caused an inmate to suffer for ten minutes after the
injection, allegedly because no physician was present to administer
the drugs correctly.196 Arguments by proponents of physician
supervision involve the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. 197 Under their argument, the presence of medical
professionals is necessary to ensure that the execution procedures do
not risk violation of the Eighth Amendment by allowing unqualified
professionals to assist in the execution process. 198
A majority of states either require or permit the presence of a
physician during executions. 199 Although the extent of requisite
participation varies by state, generally, physicians are required to
attend the execution only to pronounce death. 200 In Maryland,
nursing assistants, paramedics, correctional officers, and prison
officials complete the injection procedure. 201 A physician is present
for the sole purpose of pronouncing death. 202 Medical experts have
testified that Maryland's procedure for lethal injection places the
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

202.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 34, at 283.
Id.
Id. at 284.
See id.
Id.(quoting AMA executive vice president James Todd, M.D.)
Christopher J. Levy, Comment, Conflict of Duty: Capital Punishment Regulations
and AMA Medical Ethics, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 261, 262 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Jennifer McMenamin, Lethal Practice: In Maryland and Across the Nation, the Role
of Physicians in Executions has Become an Issue Among Medical Professionals and
the Courts, BALT. SUN, Oct. 22,2006, at Ie.
!d.
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execution in the hands of "unqualified and poorly trained"
individuals, some of whom "[do not] even comprehend their
individual responsibilities.,,203 If nothing else, such opinions by
medical experts raise the question of whether Maryland's current
method of capital punishment could result in cruel and unusual
punishment for an inmate in the execution chamber.
4.

The Question

a.

Does Maryland's capital punishment procedure constitute cruel
and unusual punishment?

The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bans the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishments. 204 Although the Constitution does
not establish boundaries for what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, the Supreme Court has set guidelines against which
punishments, such as the death penalty, can be scrutinized. 205
The Supreme Court has stated that to successfully challenge a
punishment accepted at common law, a defendant must show that it
violates current standards of decency in the community.206 The
defendant must present evidence that shows a national consensus
against the punishment, not the absence of a national consensus
supporting it. 207 The Court has often applied its general rule in death
penalty cases, most notably in Furman v. Georgia 208 and Gregg v.
Georgia. 209 Eventually, the Court sculpted a standard test in
Gregg. 210
The Court established in Gregg that a punishment is cruel and
unusual if it "involve[ s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.,,211 A punishment may also be considered cruel and unusual if
it "is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.,,212 In
other words, for a punishment to be deemed constitutional, it cannot
meet either of the two prongs of Gregg. 213 Recently, several states'

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

213.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 749 n.2303 (2006).
Id.
See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
!d. at 173 (quoting Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972)).
!d. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
Id.

Baltimore Law Review

100

[Vol. 37

capital punishment structures have been challenged under this rule. 214
One such case was Hill v. McDonough,215 where a defendant
challenged the method of his execution on Eighth Amendment
grounds. 216 The Court's landmark decision in Hill opened the door
for challenges to the lethal injection practice throughout the country.
1.

Hill v. McDonough

In 1982:1 Clarence Hill, along with an accomplice, robbed a bank at
gunpoint. 17 The police arrived at the scene of the crime during the
robbery and apprehended Hill's accomplice, Cliff Jackson. 218 In the
confusion surrounding the crime scene, Hill was able to approach~
from behind, two police officers who were handcuffing Jackson. 21
Hill shot both officers-killing one and wounding the other. 220 Hill
engaged in a shoot-out with the other officers, and suffered several
gunshot wounds before being arrested. 221 Hill was charged with
first-degree murder, among other charges, and was convicted and
sentenced to death under Florida's death penalty statute. 222 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida vacated Hill's death sentence
due to errors in the jury selection process and remanded the case for a
new sentencin,p hearing. 223 On remand, a new jury sentenced Hill to
death again. 22 This time, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the trial court ruling, and Hill was transferred to death
row. 225
On appeal, Hill challenged his death sentence on several fronts,
including an unsuccessful habeas corpus petition. 226 In Hill's last
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Jennifer McMenamin, Ohio Execution Is Evans Suit Focus, SALT. SUN, Sept. 23,
2006, at 3S.
126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).
Id. at 2100.
Hill v. Florida, 477 So. 2d 553, 554 (Fla. 1985).
Id.
/d.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hill v. Florida, 513 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 179.
Hill v. Florida, 485 U.S. 993 (I988). Hill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari after his second death sentence. /d. The petition was denied. /d.
Hill then filed for habeas corpus relief, but was again denied by the Supreme Court of
Florida. Hill v. Dugger, 556 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1990). His appeal was reopened in
1994 after another habeas corpus petition was filed in federal court, and partially
granted. Hill filed a petition to reopen his appeal to have the Florida Supreme Court
review the issues presented at the habeas corpus proceeding, but any error was found
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effort to stay his execution, just four days prior to the date for which
his execution was scheduled,227 he filed an action in federal district
court, under the federal civil rights statute. 228 Under this statute, Hill
claimed that the method by which he was to be executed violated the
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishments. 229 Hill argued that the three drugs used in lethal
injection procedures could cause severe pain: first, that the anesthetic
used was insufficient to render the administration of the second and
third drugs painless;23o and, second, "that he could remain conscious
and suffer severe pain as [the second drug] paralyzed his lungs and
body [while the third drug] caused muscle cramping and a fatal heart
attack.,,231 The district court dismissed the action, claiming that Hill
had filed a "successive" habeas corpus appeal, which is prohibited by
federal law. 232 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision,233 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether Hill's final appeal constituted a successive habeas
corpus claim or a separate action under § 1983. 234 Finding Hill's
appeal valid, the Court remanded the case for a decision in the U.S.
district court. 235 The Supreme Court, however, refused to comment
on the merits of Hill's arguments. 236
Hill's claim failed in the U.S. district court. 237 The court found
Hill's claim that the lethal injection process posed a risk of
excruciating, unnecessary pain was meritless based on a full

227.
228.

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

to be harmless, and Hill remained on death row. See generally Hill v. Florida, 643
So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1994). Hill appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but
again, that Court denied certiorari. Hill v. Florida, 516 U.S. 872 (1995).
Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2100 (2006).
42 U .S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. at 2097.
Id. at 2100.
Id.
Id. at 2097.
In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080 (lith Cir. 2006).
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. at 2097-98.
Id. at 2104.
Id.
See generally Hill v. McDonough, Slip Copy, No. 4:06-CV-032-SPM, 2006 WL
2556938 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1,2006).
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evidentiary hearing. 238 Hill was executed in Florida's death chamber
on September 20, 2006, by lethal injection. 239 Although in the end,
Hill's arguments failed to save his life, his case opened the door for
other defendants to challenge lethal injection in other parts of the
country. One such case, the case of Vernon Lee Evans, Jr., has
developed in Maryland.
11.

Evans v. State

In 1983, Evans entered into an agreement with Anthony Grandison
whereby Evans would be paid $9,000 to perform a "contract killing"
of two witnesses who were scheduled to testify against Grandison in
a narcotics case in federal court. 240 After murdering two individuals,
one of whom was a witness and one an innocent bystander, Evans
was arrested and initially charged with witness tampering and
violations of the victims' civil rights. 241 Shortly thereafter, both
Evans and Grandison were charged with two counts of first-degree
murder, and one count each of conspiracy to commit murder and use
of a handgun in the commission of a felony. 242 Evans was sentenced
to life in prison, plus an additional ten years on the witness tampering
and civil rights charges, then moved the federal court to dismiss his
murder indictment, arguing double jeopardy. 243 The trial court
denied the motion, and Evans was sentenced to death on the firstdegree murder charges. 244 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the trial court decision, and Evans appealed to the u.S.
Supreme Court, but the Court denied Evans' petition for certiorari. 245
Evans filed suit for post-conviction relief, and the circuit court
vacated the death sentence. 246 The case was removed to the Circuit
Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, and Eyans was again
sentenced to death. 247 Again, Evans appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, but that court affirmed the lower court's

238.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at *4; see also Sims v. Florida, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) (addressing
contentions that current execution procedures provide inadequate protection from
pain).
DPIC,
Searchable
Database
of Executions,
http://dcathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php (last visited March 12,2007).
Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 494, 499 A.2d 1261, 1265 (1985).
Id. at 495, 499 A.2d at 1265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 494-95, 499 A.2d 1264-65.
Evans v. Maryland, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 667, 637 A.2d 117, 120 (1994).
Id.
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decision. 248 Evans appealed to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was
denied yet again.249 Thereafter, Evans sought post-conviction relief
several times in federal court, but the court denied each of his
petitions. 25o
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hill, Evans filed
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which mirrored Hill's claims. 251
In his suit, Evans alleges that Maryland's lethal injection procedure,
which is significantly similar to the challenged procedure from
Florida (and other states who utilize lethal injection), poses a risk of
causing excessive pain to Evans, and therefore, violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 252
The district court has not yet rendered a decision in Evans's § 1983
action, although the analysis will likely resemble that which was set
forth in Gregg v. Georgia: 253 whether the punishment "involves the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,,254 and whether the
punishment is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.,,255
b.

Does Maryland's method of execution involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction ofpain?

Maryland's method of lethal injection will be considered cruel and
unusual if it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction ofsI?ain256
or the "risk of unnecessary pain, violence, and mutilation.,,2
The
arguments asserting Maryland's lethal injection practice is violative
of the Eighth Amendment include: (a) the claim that the sedative
used to anesthetize the condemned inmate wears off prior to death,
therefore subjecting the inmate to severe pain during the

248.
249.
250.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 666, 637 A.2d at 120.
Evans v. Maryland, 513 U.S. 833 (1994).
Evans filed a habeas corpus petition in 1999, which was denied by the federal court.
Evans v. Smith, 54 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D. Md. 1999). The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision, Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2000), and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, 532 U.S. 925 (2001). In 2004, Evans's postconviction relief petition was reviewed, but again, denied. Evans v. State, 389 Md.
456, 886 A.2d 562 (2005).
Gibson & McMenamin, supra note 7.
Id.
See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238,392-93 (1972)).
Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93).
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

104

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

execution;258 (b) witness accounts of inmates suffering through
excruciating executions over an extended period of time;259 (c)
mistakes by the injection team which could botch an execution and
cause unnecessary pain to the inmate;260 and, (d) the assertion that
the drug Pavulon, used in Maryland's execution practice, has been
banned from use on animals because of the severe pain it inflicts. 261
Although the original intent of the lethal injection process was to
"cause death rapidly and without pain,,,262 contemporary thought,
however, acknowledges the fact that not all executions by lethal
injection are painless. 263 In fact, "it's harder to execute someone
painlessly than would seem likely.,,264
1.

The sedative used to anesthetize the condemned inmate wears
off prior to death

The latest trend in arguments made in opposition of Maryland's
death penalty practice is that the sedative wears off prior to the
prisoner's death. 265 The problem with this argument is based on the
uncertainty of the inmate's physical condition resulting from the
combination of drugs used in the execution. 266 Because Pavulon is
used to paralyze the body, it is difficult to discern the physical state
of the inmate, who is unable to move or register pain due to the
paralytic. 267 The inmate's body remains calm, although he or she has
full sensory perception as the lethal drugs pump into his or her body,
stopping the heart. 268 It is commonly held by medical professionals
that were the sedative to wear off prior to death, the inmate would
feel excruciating pain as the final drug was injected. 269 In such
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260.
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264.

265.
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Ewart, supra note 126, at 1159.
See. e.g., McMenamin, supra note 214.
Jennifer McMenamin, Uncertainty on Execution Team, BALT. SUN, Sept. 21, 2006, at
lB.
Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.
!d. at 1167.
!d.
Id. (quoting American Morning: Last-Minute Energy Funding: P.R. Ploy?;
California Execution Delayed Due to Ethical Dilemma (CNN television broadcast
Feb. 21, 2006)).
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1159-60.
Id.
Id. at 1159, 1167.
Brief of Drs. Kevin Concannon, Dennis Geiser & Glenn Pettifer, Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006), 2006 WL
542180.
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circumstances, the pain felt by the inmate would likely amount to a
level considered unnecessary and wanton by society's standards.
11.

Witness accounts show that inmates sometimes suffer through
excruciating executions over an extended period of time

Arguments are also made against the lethal injection process based
on eye-witness accounts of executions. 27o Dorian Hall, a social
worker in Ohio's public defender's office, witnessed the lethal
injection of Joseph Lewis Clark in 2006. 271 Her testimony is at the
root of Vernon Lee Evans's challenge to Maryland's lethal injection
process. 272 Hall testified that after the three drugs were injected into
Clark, his legs moved, he raised his head, and he told the execution
team that the process was not working. 273 The execution team then
pulled a curtain in order to shield witnesses from viewinj9 the process
once it was clear the first execution attempt had failed. 4 Hall then
testified that, although the curtain prevented her from seeing the
execution, she heard Clark issue "loud, intense guttural moans and
groans, as if [he] was in agony.,,275 The execution took a total of
ninety minutes, far beyond the intended duration of an execution. 276
This testimony serves as a first-hand account of the possible
unnecessary and wanton pain suffered by condemned inmates during
their execution. 277
iii. Mistakes by the injection team can cause botched executions
which lead to unnecessary pain for the inmate
The most controversial argument in lethal injection litigation
involves the use of Pavulon creating a risk of excruciating pain for
the inmate if the injection cocktail is not perfectly administered. 278
The risk of a botched injection, and therefore a high risk of potential
pain for the inmate, increases if the execution is administered by
poorly trained individuals. 279 This issue has been brought to the
270.
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272.
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274.
275.
276.
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278.

279.

McMenamin, supra note 214.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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See Patricia Roy, Not So Shocking: The Death a/the Electric Chair in Georgia at the
Hands a/the Georgia Supreme Court in Dawson v. State, 53 MERCER L. REv. 1695,
1703 (2002).
See McMenamin, supra note 260.
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district court III Maryland through Evans's suit. 280 During trial,
members of Maryland's execution team testified about their
understanding of their roles during an execution. 281 One corrections
officer on the execution team, whose only medical training is limited
to basic first-aid courses offered to prison guards, testified that his
main responsibility is to replate the flow of the intravenous (IV)
lines during the injection. 28 This officer also testified that he was
unaware of several critical procedures in the injection Erocess, the
failure of any of which could cause a botched execution. 2 3 A second
execution team member, who actually administers the injections,
testified that he had no experience with IV medications prior to
joining Maryland's execution team. 284 After the testimony was
presented, doctors, testifying as experts, stated that knowledge and
understanding of the "lethal injection procedure ... [was] lacking
among execution team members.,,285 Such inexperience on the
execution team presents a great risk that the initial anesthetic could
fail, "leaving [a condemned prisoner] conscious when the heartstopping chemical enters his system-but paralyzed and unable to
signal his distress.,,286
Evans's execution poses an even higher risk of pain, given Evans's
almost-daily i~ection of heroine over decades of drug addiction
during his life. 7 The state of Evans's veins calls for a more precise
injection made through a central vein in Evans's chest, rather than the
standard injection through a vein in the arm. 288 Such a procedure
would need to be performed by a trained medical professional to
ensure success. 289 As medical professionals are unable to perform
executions under the Hypocratic Oath,290 the risk of a botched

280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
Id.
!d.
See id. The officer specifically testified that he

[D]id not know what it means to run an IV line at a slow drip, that
he would not be able to tell whether the saline solution was
flowing too quickly and that he did not know whether an IV linc
can "go bad" if fluids are injected too quickly.
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Id.
!d.
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See id.
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Levy, supra note 196, at 261-62.
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execution, 'causing unnecessary and wanton pam during Evans's
execution, is considerable. 291
iv. Pavulon has been banned from use on animals because of the
severe pain it inflicts
In 2000, a panel of veterinarians created by the American
Veterinary Medical Association stated, in a report on animal
euthanasia, that the use of Pavulon, either by itself or in combination
with certain anesthetics, can "cause respiratory arrest before loss of
consciousness, so the animal may perceive pain and distress after it is
immobilized.,,292 Furthermore, veterinarians have testified that the
use of Pavulon could cause a patient to be "aware of the need to
breathe, the inability to do so and the terrifying experience of
suffocation.,,293 The fact that the use of Pavulon has been outlawed
against animals has not affected the lethal injection process, as it is
still used in most states today. 294
Based on the evidence, there is a strong basis to argue that
Maryland's death penalty system is in violation of the Eighth
Amendment due to the risk of unnecessary and wanton pain the
procedure could cause. 295 Maryland continues to utilize Pavulon, a
drug proven to cause excruciating pain for animals, in its execution
cocktail. 296 Even if Pavulon could be administered painlessly, as
long as Maryland employs unqualified and poorly trained individuals
on its execution team the very real threat of a botched execution will
be a paramount risk. i 97 Even if administered correctly, the sedative
used to anesthetize an inmate could wear off, causing an inmate
extreme pain without the ability to alert their agony to the execution
team. 298 Finally, witness testimony has provided that the same
execution procedure (including the exact drug cocktail used in
Maryland) has caused extreme pain to inmates in the past. 299 The
evidence suggests that Maryland's death penalty procedure carries a
heavy risk of causing unnecessary and wanton pain to an inmate,
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Gibson & McMenamin, supra note 7.
Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.
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Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.
See Levy, supra note 196; cf supra notes 265-294 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
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even when perfonned correctly; this risk is violative of the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
c.

Is Maryland's method of execution disproportionate to the
severity of the crime?

The second prong of the Gregg test, whether a punishment is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime, can be difficult to
analyze. 300 Each crime-punishment relationship must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis given that such an analysis is so factspecific. 301 As the Court's model for evaluating punishments only
requires that one of the two prongs of the Gregg test be met to deem
a punishment unconstitutional, Maryland's capital punishment
structure must still be considered unconstitutional because the lethal
injection process presents a risk (or actuality) of unnecessary or
wanton infliction of pain. 302 Given the picture painted by the totality
of the evidence, a considerable risk of severe pain to a condemned
inmate exists, and therefore, under the protections of the Eighth
Amendment, the death penalty should be outlawed in Maryland until
such time that a painless, less risky procedure can be perfected.
III. THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
As dictated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the death penalty
is on hiatus in the state pending legislative and possible public review
of the system. 303 Although this moratorium is a power move by the
judicial branch to correct the wrongs of the Maryland death penalty
system, it falls short of the goal, expressed by Justice Blackmun in
Callins v. Collins: 304 To create a system that "deliver[s] the fair,
consistent, and reliable sentence[] of death required by the
Consti tution. ,,305
A.

Can Maryland Supply a Fair, Consistent and Reliable Sentence
of Death?

The fact remains that Maryland's death penalty system is not a fair,
consistent, and reliable punishment. Studies done by the University
of Maryland provide evidence that defendants who kill whites are
300.
301.

302.
303.
304.
305.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
Cf Derek S. Bentsen, Note, Beyond Statutory Elements: The Substantive Effects of
the Right to a Jury Trial on Constitutionally Significant Facts, 90 VA. L. REv. 645,
674-75 (2004).
Cf supra notes 265-294 and accompanying text.
McMenamin, supra note 139.
510 U.S. 1141, 1143-46 (1994) (B1ackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1146.
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more likely to receive a death sentence than killers of non-whites. 306
The jurisdiction in which the crime was committed is also a factor. 307
More defendants are charged with and convicted of capital crimes in
Baltimore County than in any other county in Maryland despite the
fact that other counties have higher rates of "death-eligible" cases. 308
In recent years, Maryland's death penalty cases have been driven
more by politics than by the reality of the crimes committed. 309 As it
stands, the Maryland system presents the possibility of human error
resulting in a wrongful execution. 31 0 At a press conference in 2003,
then-Attorney General J. Joseph Curran called for an end to
Maryland's death penalty, citing "an intolerable risk of killing an
innocent person" and two cases where Maryland inmates were
exonerated from capital convictions through DNA evidence. 311 In
that press conference, Curran also called for a revision of Maryland's
death penalty statute. 312 Other state officials have called the
Maryland death penalty system "a mess.,,313 Despite these calls for
change, there has been no significant revision made to the death
penalty statute since that date. 314 In fact, prominent anti -death
penalty advocates have charged that "[a]ll three branches of
government in Maryland are refusing to deal with" the problems
presented by the study.315
Throughout the United States, the problem persists. A majority of
states utilize the same lethal injection procedures, but few states have
implemented changes, despite growing pressure from the nation's
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court system. 316 In fact, one of Maryland's own administrative
judges has called the current system '''legally ineffective' because [it
was] not created with public input.,,317 The moratorium implemented
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland is a start, but it fails to prompt
the necessary changes that could lessen the risk of excruciating pain
for executed prisoners. 318
IV. CONCLUSION
"Amnesty International defines torture as an extreme physical and
mental assault on a person who has been rendered defenseless.,,319 It
is this torture which the U.S. Constitution aims to prevent. As
dictated by Furman v. Georgia 320 and Gregg v. Georgia,321 the
Constitution prevents cruel and unusual punishments which involve
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
As laid out
previously, Maryland's method of execution creates the extreme risk
of such pain, and is therefore unconstitutional.
Recent challenges to the death penalty argue that the anesthetic
used in a majority of executions can wear off prior to death. Eyewitness accounts provide evidence that often, executions have not
been completed painlessly, even when procedures are presumably
completed in conformance with protocol. The lack of experience and
training of Maryland's execution team produces a risk of botched
executions. Finally, the drug cocktail is so powerful that it has been
banned for use on animals due to the intense pain it inflicts. Each of
these four concerns present a significant risk of excruciating pain for
the inmate. The culmination of this evidence leads to one conclusion:
In its present state, Maryland's capital punishment procedure is no
more than the kind of torture condemned by Amnesty International
and other human rights groups across the globe, and the kind
forbidden by the U.S. Constitution.
The debate over the whether to abolish capital punishment in
Maryland will come to fruition as dictated by the moratorium
implemented by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Because such a
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controversial issue must be decided based on the current state of
public opinion, as dictated by Gregg v. Georgia 322 and by
Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act, capital punishment in
Maryland remains in limbo. If a majority of the public returns a
general favoritism for capital punishment, a long-term, open-ended
moratorium should be implemented until such time that the
legislature approves a bill establishing a fair, consistent, and reliable
sentence of death approved by the public. Should the public return a
general disfavor for capital punishment, Maryland should take a
leadership role in this country and outlaw capital punishment,
securing the protections of the Eighth Amendment for condemned
prisoners in Maryland.
Matthew E. Feinberg
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